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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Nature O[The Case
This an appeal by the Appellant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, based upon the District
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order entered on April 16, 2013 reversing the Magistrate's
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress entered on July 25, 2012 granting
Appellant's Motion to Suppress and excluding any and all evidence that was derived from the
preliminary breath test and later obtained as a result thereof.

B. Procedural History
Mr. Nicolescu was cited for the misdemeanor charge of Driving under the Influence of
Alcohol, Idaho Code § 18-8004 on October 15,2011. See, R., p. 5.
On October 27,2011, the undersigned counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and other
pleadings, including an extension of time to file pre-trial motions which the Magistrate Court
granted. See, R, pp. 6-8. On December 5,2011, Mr. Nicolescu filed his Motion to Suppress and
the evidentiary hearing was held July 2,2012. See, R, pp. 38-51 and 71.
After taking the matter under advisement, The Honorable John Hawley issued his
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress on July 25,2012, granting Mr.
Nicolsecu's Motion to Suppress. See, R, pp. 73-83. On August 29, 2012, the State filed its
Notice of Appeal and Motion to Hold Matter in Abeyance. See, R., pp. 86-90.
On April 3, 2012, oral argument was presented to the District Court on the State's appeal.
After taking the matter under advisement, The Honorable Michael McLaughlin issued his
Memorandum Decision and Order on April 16, 2013, reversing the Magistrate's decision. See,
R, pp. 162-175.
On May 3,2012, Mr. Nicolescu filed his Notice of Appeal. See, R, pp. 176-179.
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C Statement o[Facts
On October 15,2011, Mr. Nicolescu was driving on Idaho Street on his way home when
his vehicle was T-boned by a driver who ran a red light at the intersection. See, R., p. 50. The
driver of the other vehicle, James F. Pollard, was charged and pled guilty to inattentive driving.

See., R., p. 25. 1 Officer Chris Palic responded to the vehicular collision at the intersection of
th

Idaho and 16 streets in the city of Boise. See, R., p. 73. 2 At the scene, Officer Palic made
contact with Kevin Nicolsecu who was one of the drivers involved in the collision. See id
During the contact, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Mr.
Nicolescu as he spoke. See id In addition, Officer Palic noted that Mr. Nicolescu had red,
bloodshot, watery eyes and Mr. Nicolsecu stated he had consumed some alcohol that evening.

See, R. p. 74. Officer Palic observed cuts and abrasions to Mr. Nicolescu's face which he
assumed were caused by the deployment of the airbag during the collision. See, R., p. 73.
Officer Palic also noted that Mr. Nicolescu was not slurring his speech and did not show any
signs of memory impairment. See id Officer Palic was not aware of any traffic infractions or
driving pattern because his only contact was with Mr. Nicolescu was after the collision. See, R.,
p.74.
At that point, Officer Palic asked Mr. Nicolescu to submit to the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus (HGN) test. See id Mr. Nicolescu complied and Officer Palic began to administer
the test, but then had to stop the test because Mr. Nicolescu's left eye was bothering him. See id
Officer Palic tried to continue the test again, but was only able to get a "partial nystagmus test"
"cause it was clearly bothering him." (TR., p. 9, Lll-12).3 Based on the partial nystagmus test

I The State's response to request for discovery referred the defense to the on-line Idaho Supreme Court Data
Repository at https://www.idcourt.us to discover the criminal history of the witnesses it identified.
2 The District Court recited the Magistrate's factual findings verbatim. See, R., pp. 163-165.
3 Transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on July 2,2012 before the Honorable John Hawley, Jr., Magistrate
Court Judge.
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performed, Officer Palic detected four (4) decisions points out of the possible six (6) decision
points. See, R, p. 74. Paramedics on the scene examined Mr. Nicolescu and noted he had a
scratched cornea at the time the HGN test was administered. See, R, p. 75.
Officer Palic elected not to conduct any other Field Sobriety Tests (FSTs) because of the
adrenaline setting in from the collision. See, R., p. 74. Officer Palic felt that because of the
adrenaline, going forward with other FSTs would have clearly affected his performance on them.
(TR, p. 10, LL 2-13, p. 18, Ll. 13-15). On cross-examination, when asked why he elected not to
administer any further FSTs, Officer Palic responded:
Again, it was to benefit Mr. Nicolescu. I could tell he was obviously - - the
adrenaline was starting to kick in from the collision; I could just tell that just
based on how he was standing, you could see him physically shaking. So, to give
him the benefit of the doubt, I was not going to make him go through those,
'cause clearly he would have met decision points and it would have been
much harder to determine, okay, is that the result of him and adrenaline.
(Tr., p. 18, Ll. 16-25) (Emphasis added).
At this point, Officer Palic decided to administer a preliminary breath test with the AlcoSensor which produced a result of .108. See, R, p. 75. Based on the result from the preliminary
breath test, Officer Palic continued his investigation and then proceeded to observe the 15 minute
wait period, played him the ALS advisory form, checked the Lifeloc device and administered
two additional breath samples. See id.
On cross-examination, Officer Palic acknowledged that it was reasonable to conclude that
dust and debris from the deployment of an air bag would give the appearance of someone having
glassy and bloodshot eyes. (TR, p. 13, Ll. 20-25, p. 14, Ll. 1-18).
Both Officer Palic and Officer Moore acknowledged when administering an evidentiary
test, it is mandatory procedure to wait 15 minutes before administering the test. (TR., p. 19, Ll.
10-25, p. 20, L. 1, p. 35, Ll. 12-25, p. 36, L. 1). When Officer Palic decided to administer the
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preliminary test, he admitted that he did not conduct the mandatory 15 minute wait period. (TR.,
p. 20, Ll. 2-5).
Officers Palic and Moore, Palic's supervisor, testified that they were unaware of any
statutory authority or any rules or regulations that governed administering a preliminary test.
(TR., p. 20, LL 9-25, p. 33, Ll. 2-25, p. 34, LL 1-2).
Officer Palic stated that he had enough information and would have placed Mr. Nicolescu
under arrest regardless of the preliminary breath test. (TR., p. 10, Ll. 19-25, p. 11, Ll. 1-4).
However, Officer Moore's testimony contradicted Officer Palic's opinion. When asked, Officer
Moore responded as follows:
By Mr. Guerricabeitia:
Q. If Mr. Nicolsecu had blown a - - under a .08, would he have been
arrested?
A. No.

By Ms. Miller:

Q. When you say he would not have been arrested had he blown under a
.08, are you talking about the evidentiary test that you did?
A. No. InQ. Are youA. - regards to the presumptive. I - I call it a presumptive test rather than
a preliminary test.
Q. Okay. And so, you're saying that ifhe would have blown under the
.08 for - oh, I guess A. Using the ALCO-SENSOR, had that been under the .08, no, I don't
believe we would have proceeded any further with it.
Q. Even given the other observations that you made?
A. More than likely yes, that would have not happened.
(TR., p. 40, Ll. 9-11 and 20-25, p. 41, Ll. 1-10).
Officer Moore corroborates his conclusion, noting that he has on occasion relied on the
results of a preliminary breath test to support his belief and/or probable cause despite
acknowledging the results produced by the ALCO·SENSOR are not accurate or certified by the
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State. (TR., p. 37, Ll. 11-25, p. 38, L. 1).
A.
... we typically use it for, you know, have somebody that's been drinking
alcohol, to - you know, whether or not they've been drinking or not so.
I have, on occasion, used a couple of them to check and see where they're
at, as far as (unintelligible) a performance verification on them, and they're
typically very close to what they should be. They match what - the solution we
use, a .08 and .20.
So, typically, they were - they're close, but they're just not - the State has
never touched them and certified them as - for use in the field as an evidentiary
test.
Officer Moore's response on re-direct further corroborates that without the preliminary
breath test result, the investigation would have been done and Mr. Nicolescu would not been
arrested on the suspicion of driving under the influence:
Q. And when you are giving a preliminary breath test, what is it that you're
interested in obtaining from the test?
A. Typically, it's for the purpose of showing that he is consuming alcohol andand sometimes, you know, where he's at as far as the amount of alcohol in his
system.
Q. Okay. Are you interested in the specific number in thatA. NotQ. - event?
A. - not necessarily, no.
(TR., p. 39, LI. 14-25).

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A)

Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that the

Preliminary Breath Test was not an Evidentiary Test as described under the Idaho Code;
B)

Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that Reasonable

and Articulable Suspicion was the Legal Standard to Administer the Preliminary Breath Test;
and
C)

Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that the

preliminary breath test result could be used to form the basis of probable cause to administer
further evidentiary testing.
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IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
On appeal from a trial court's order resolving a motion to suppress evidence, the
appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial
evidence, but freely reviews the trial court's determination and application of constitutional
principles to the facts found. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005).
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences vested in the trial court." State v.
Leclercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093 (App.20l0).

In State v. Dewitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215,217 (App. Ct. 2008), the Idaho
Court of Appeals noted that the Idaho Supreme Court altered the standard of review of a decision
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity.
Rather than directly reviewing the magistrate court's decision independently of,
but with due regard for, the district court's decision, we instead directly review
the district court's decision. (Citation omitted). We do examine the magistrate
record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions
of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's
decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.
(Citation omitted).
B. The District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that the Preliminary
Breath Test was not an Evidentiary Test as described under the Idaho Code.
On appeal from the Magistrate, the State argued the Magistrate erred in holding that Mr.
Nicolescu did not consent freely, understandingly and voluntarily to the preliminary breath test
because Idaho Code § 18-1002(1) provided the necessary consent to administer any breath or
blood test from a suspect who was driving on public roads and therefore an officer did not have
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to obtain specific consent. See, R., p. 106-108. The District Court disagreed and addressed the
State's argument as follows:
However, if this were considered as an evidentiary test, Mr. Nicolescu would also
have the right to be informed, "[a]t the time of the evidentiary testing ... that if he
refuses to submit to or if he fails to complete, evidentiary testing" he is subject to
certain sanctions. Mr. Nicolescu was not informed of this, and since the court
does not believe that a preliminary breath test is an "evidentiary test," so it
appears that this code section cannot be relied upon to provide implied consent for
Mr. Nicolescu. See, R., p. 167.
Instead, the District Court accepted the State's alternative argument that the preliminary
breath was not an evidentiary test for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-8002( 1) but rather a roadside
field sobriety test requiring reasonable suspicion to be administered.
In concluding that the preliminary breath test administered was akin to a field sobriety
test rather than an evidentiary test, the District Court held the officer only needed reasonable and
articulable suspicion to administer the preliminary breath test, relying on State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474,988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999) holding that "based on established precedent and
thorough analysis, that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires only
that an officer possess reasonable suspicion that a driver is operating a vehicle contrary to I.e. §
18-8004 before field sobriety tests may be administered." See id, 133 Idaho at 480-81,988 P.2d
at 705-06.
In support of the conclusion that a preliminary breath test is the same or similar to field
sobriety testing, the District Court relied on general statements from other jurisdictions which
equated a preliminary breath test to physical field sobriety tests, specifically, State v. Lucas, 934
N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) and State v. Kinney, 190 Vt. 195,27 A.3d 348 (2011). See, R.,
p. 170. However, the Indiana and Vermont cases are distinguishable from the case at hand, in
that both Indiana and Vermont Legislatures specifically addressed and codified the use of
preliminary breath tests as a means to determine the presence of alcohol and/or whether
APPELLANT'S BRlEF - 10

probable cause existed for an arrest. 4
Idaho's Legislature has not addressed or codified the use of preliminary breath tests
under the DUI statutes. Incidentally, neither has the Idaho state police promulgated any rule or
regulation regarding the use of preliminary breath tests in a DUI context. The Idaho
Constitution vests the legislative branch with the exclusive power to create statutes or laws
while the judicial branch has the exclusive authority to interpret those laws. l\;fead v. Arnell,
117 Idaho 660, 664 & 669, 791 P.2d 410,414 & 419 (1990).
The District Court found that the specific lack of authorization or prohibition of
preliminary breath tests under the Idaho Code was not dispositive because field sobriety tests
are, also, not specifically authorized under the Idaho Code. See, R, p. 167. The Indiana and
Vermont cases in which the District Court relied on with regards to preliminary breath tests,
also, do not specifically authorize field sobriety tests such as the HGN test, walk and tum, one
legged stand and other physical dexterity tests, however, do specifically authorize preliminary
breath tests under their statutory framework. The fact that those jurisdictions specifically
include preliminary breath tests as a means, but omit other investigative tools would indicate
that preliminary breath tests are unique to other forms of physical sobriety tests which are
subjective and not indicative of any concentration level of alcohol, but merely indicative of the
presence of alcohol use by a person. See State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881, 811 P .2d 488,
491 (1990) ("We note, however, that the HGN test results are not admissible for all purposes.
HGN test results may not be used at trial to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level in the
absence of the chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, breath, or urine.") (Emphasis added).

Attached hereto as an addendum is a copy of the Indiana and Vermont statutes referenced in the cases cited by the
District Court. See, LA.R. 35(f).

4
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The District Court distinguished an evidentiary test from a preliminary breath test stating:
"Evidentiary testing" means a test that is conducted for the purpose of
determining alcohol concentration. In other words, an evidentiary test is a test
conducted for the purpose of establishing proof of the level of alcohol
concentration in a person. That is not the purpose of a preliminary breath test. A
preliminary breath test is utilized, as discussed in more detail hereinafter, like any
other field sobriety test, as "a method for making a threshold determination as to
whether a person has consumed alcohol." State v. Lucas, 934 N.E.2d 202, 205
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A preliminary breath test, consequently, is not an
evidentiary test, as that term is described in the Idaho Code. See. R., p. 167 (Fn.
3).
In New Phase Investments, LLC v. DAFCO, LLC, 153 Idaho 207, 280 P.3d 710 (2012),
the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the standard for statutory interpretation as follows:
When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, this Court takes the
following approach:
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document ...
When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent
of the legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not
consider rules of statutory construction. Id., 153 Idaho at 210,280 P.3d at
713.
Under Idaho's DUI statutes there are several references and definitions describing an
"evidentiary test." Idaho Code § 18-8002(9) defines an evidentiary test as follows:
(9) For purposes of this section and section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, "evidentiary
testing" shall mean a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests, including
the additional test authorized in subsection (10) of this section, utilized to
determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances in a person. (Emphasis added).
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(l)(e) defines "evidentiary testing" as:
"Evidentiary testing" means a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests
utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or
other intoxicating substances in a person, including additional testing authorized
by subsection (6) of this section. An evidentiary test for alcohol concentration
shall be based on a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath, or sixty-seven
APPELLANT'S BRlEF - 12

(67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, breath or urine for the purpose of
determining alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police
under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by the Idaho
state police, or by any method approved by the Idaho state police.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the results for alcohol
concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, certification or quality
control performed by a laboratory operated and approved by the Idaho state police
or by any method approved by the Idaho state police shall be admissible in any
proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a witness to establish
the reliability of the testing procedure for examination. (Emphasis added). See
also, Idaho Code § 18-8004(4).
The code sections referenced above do not create a distinction between a preliminary or
"presumptive" breath test from an evidentiary breath test. However, the above referenced code
sections do provide procedural requirements necessary in order for a breath test result to be
offered as evidence at trial.
In this case, the purpose of the preliminary breath test with the Alco-Sensor administered
by Officer Palic was to determine the concentration of alcohol in Mr. Nicolescu's system, not for
determining the presence of alcohoL Officer Palic already had actual knowledge that Mr.
Nicolescu had drank that evening by his admission and the odor of alcohoL Officer Palic was
uncertain, speculating and using his instinct to confirm or dispel his belief that Mr. Nicolescu
may have committed a crime. In other words, Officer Palic had a hunch. The testimony of
Officer Moore on redirect with the State supports this:
Q. And when you are giving a preliminary breath test, what is it that you're
interested in obtaining from that test?
A. Typically, it's for the purpose of showing he is consuming alcohol, and - and
sometimes, you know, where he's at as far as the amount of alcohol in his system.
Q. Okay. Are you interested in the specific number in thatA. NotQ. - event?
A. - not necessarily, no.

Officer Moore also testified that on occasion he would use the preliminary breath test
results to "see where they're at, as (unintelligible) a performance verification on them, and
APPELLANT'S BRlEF - 13

they're typically very close to what they should be ... So, typically, they were - they're close,
but they're just not

the State has never touched them and certified them as - for use in the field

as an evidentiary test." (TR., p. 37, Ll. 19-21, LL 23-25, p. 38, L. 1).
The result from the preliminary breath test was the only reason the investigation
continued which then proceeded to the subsequent breath tests administered with the LifeLoc
device to determine the concentration of alcohol in Mr. Nicolescu's system for purposes of trial.
Officer Moore testified that had the preliminary breath test result been under .08 the
investigation would have been concluded, refuting Officer Palic's testimony that he would have
arrested Mr. Nicolescu without the preliminary breath test result. It was the preliminary breath
test result which provided Officer Palic the probable cause he needed to administer the
subsequent breath tests with the LifeLoc device. From the statutory language, it is clear that an
evidentiary test is any breath, urine or blood test used to determine the concentration of alcohol
in a person, regardless of the admissibility of the results. The District Court's distinction
between a preliminary versus an evidentiary breath test is unfounded under the plain language of
the statute and the facts of this case.
Based on the foregoing, the District Court's ruling that the preliminary breath test was
not an evidentiary test as described under the Idaho Code should be reversed.

C. The District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that Reasonable and
Articulable Suspicion was the Legal Standard to Administer the Preliminary
Breath Test.
The District Court's finding that the preliminary breath test was another form offield
sobriety test, not an evidentiary test, supported its holding that Officer Palic met the lesser
standard of reasonable suspicion to administer the preliminary breath test. As discussed above,
there is no distinction between a preliminary breath test and an evidentiary test as described
under the Idaho Code.
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The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure
of the person and a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d
908,917-18 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P3d 739, 741 (2007).
A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless the state can prove
that the search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006).

Consent is one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532
(Ct.App. 2000). An investigative stop is also an exception to the warrant requirement. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,88 S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479,

988 P.2d, 700, 705 (Ct.App.l999).
Idaho Code § 18-1002(1) sets forth the standard for testing a driver's alcohol
concentration and the presence of drugs and other intoxicating substances. The code section
reads:
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have
given consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating
substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request of a
peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.
(Emphasis added).
Idaho Courts have yet to decide the proper legal standard for an officer to request a breath
test. Based on a recent decision, it appears that the standard for any evidentiary testing is
something more than reasonable suspicion.
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In Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 2003), this Court
stated that it was not clear that probable cause was the correct standard for an officer to arrest a
suspect and request a breath test, even though the defendant and the state agreed that it was the
applicable prerequisite. Because the higher standard of probable cause was satisfied in this
instance, this Court declined to resolve the narrow issue. Probable cause existed in Thompson
where the officer observed the defendant speeding, detected a strong odor of alcohol on his
breath, observed bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, was aware that the defendant refused to take
field sobriety tests, and had reason to believe the defendant lied when he stated that he had not
been drinking. Collectively, these circumstances supported the officer's reasonable belief that
the defendant was driving while under the influence. See id
This Court further stated in Thompson that its decision in State v. Ferreira, l33 Idaho
474, 988 P 2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999), where it held that officers may administer field sobriety tests
based on reasonable suspicion, suggested that the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion may
suffice for an officer administering evidentiary tests. Id
However, field sobriety tests and evidentiary tests are not synonymous. As noted above,
an evidentiary test is the testing of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the
concentration of alcohol Q! the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in a person.
I.C § 18-8002A(1)(e). Field sobriety tests are generally categorized as standardized and non-

standardized testing. Standardized testing established by the US National Highway Traffic and
Safety Administration include the One-Leg Stand, Walk and Tum and HGN tests. Nonstandardized testing includes Rhomberg Balance test, Finger-to-Nose test, Finger-Count Test,
Hand Pat test, ABC test and Numbers Backward test. These field sobriety tests consist of
various cognitive and coordination tasks, but none can quantify a concentration level of a
person's blood alcohol content.
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Since the lesser standard applies to field sobriety tests and Idaho Code § 18-8002(1)
requires an officer to have reasonable grounds to believe before requesting a suspect to submit to
evidentiary testing, it appears from the statute that more than reasonable suspicion is required for
an officer to administer evidentiary testing.

In State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 275 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012), this Court
again analyzed and discussed the proper legal standard between reasonable suspicion versus
probable cause in the context of a DUI case. In Martinez-Gonzalez, officers were called to an
apartment complex parking lot to investigate suspicious activity. The officers encountered
Martinez-Gonzalez sitting in the driver's seat of a parked car with two other passengers.
Martinez-Gonzalez explained they were drinking in the vehicle to avoid upsetting their wives.
During the encounter, officers observed open beer cans in the front and back seats of the vehicle,
Martinez-Gonzalez slightly slurred speech, glassy eyes, detected the odor of alcohol and
Martinez-Gonzalez admitted to consuming alcohol. Officers advised him to walk horne, but
instead, he started the vehicle and drove across the parking lot. Officers initiated a stop and
asked him to perform field sobriety tests which he refused to perform. Thereafter, an officer
arrested Martinez-Gonzalez on suspicion of driving under the influence.
During the search of his person, officers discovered methamphetamine in his pocket.
Martinez-Gonzalez submitted to a breath test which revealed a blood alcohol content below the
legal limit. Martinez-Gonzalez was not charged for DUI, but instead felony possession of a
controlled substance. Martinez-Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that
the officer lacked probable cause he was under the influence of alcohol and the DUI charge
occurred on private property not covered by the criminal statute. The district court rejected both
arguments which he appealed.
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On appeal, Martinez-Gonzalez argued the officer had only a mere hunch or
unparticularized suspicion that he was under the influence of alcohol and therefore had no
probable cause as to the first element of the DUI offense. The State responded that the officer
had reasonable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests which rose to probable cause to arrest
him on suspicion of DUI after he refused to participate in the field sobriety tests.
This Court cited several of its cases and the facts which led to its determination that
probable cause to arrest an individual for suspicion of DUI was satisfied, including Ferreira,
supra., and Thompson, supra, cases. In referring to its decision in Thompson, this Court stated,
"[W]e later concluded that a driver's refusal to participate in field sobriety tests may be a factor
in determining whether probable cause exists that a driver is under the influence of alcohol, as
the refusal or evasion of field sobriety tests can infer a guilty conscience." See ld, 152 Idaho at
779-80,275 P.3d at 5-6. Accordingly, this Court concluded that since field sobriety tests are
used to confirm or dispel an officer's reasonable suspicion that a driver is under the influence of
alcohol, and since performing poorly on such tests "can raise the level of suspicion to probable
cause, the driver's refusal to participate may do the same." See td, 152 Idaho at 780,275
P .3d at 6. (Emphasis added).
In its review of the record, the facts found by the district court in determining probable
cause were 1) open beer cans in front and back seats, 2) glazed eyes and slurred speech, 3) odor
of alcohol, 4) admission of drinking, 5) driving after being advised not to and 6) refusing to
participate in field sobriety tests. This Court held that due to the lack of evidence in the record
and no contradictory facts to those testified by the arresting officer, the facts found by the district
court were supported by the record and sufficient to establish probable cause for a DUI arrest.
Seeid
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Alternatively, this Court held that even if the facts did not constitute probable cause, they
certainly met the threshold of reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct field sobriety tests
which Martinez-Gonzalez refused to perform. Again, this Court found no evidence or
contradictory testimony presented by the defense to the district court's conclusion. This Court
specifically noted that the appellate court defers credibility determinations to the trial court
which found the officer's testimony credible. See id. 152 Idaho at 780-81,275 P.3d at 6-7.
Although this Court did not specifically resolve the issue in the Thompson case of the
legal standard necessary to request an individual to submit to a breath test in a DUI case, the
facts and Court's statements expressed in the Martinez-Gonzalez decision can reasonably be
inferred that the legal standard for a request to submit to a breath test is probable cause.
Specifically, this Court's statement is compelling: "[B]ecause field sobriety tests are used
to either confirm or dispel an officer's reasonable suspicion that a driver is under the influence of
alcohol, just as performing poorly on such tests can raise the level of suspicion to probable
cause, the driver's refusal to participate may do the same." See id, 152 Idaho at 780,275

P .3d at 6. (Emphasis added).
In addition, this Court agreed with the district court's determination that probable cause
existed before the defendant submitted to the breath test. The facts found which lead to the arrest
of Martinez-Gonzalez on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol occurred before the
breath test was administered. See id., 152 Idaho at 777, 275 P.3d at 3.
In State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133,922 P.2d 1059 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court
expressed the standard for probable cause as follows:
Reasonable or probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a
person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong
presumption that such person is gUilty. (Citation omitted). Probable cause is
not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction. (Citation
omitted). Rather, it deals with "the factual and practical considerations of
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 19

everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians,
act" (Citation omitted).
When reviewing an officer's actions the court must judge the facts against an
objective standard. That is, "would the facts available to the officer at the moment
of the seizure or search 'warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief' that
the action taken was appropriate." (Citation omitted). Because the facts making
up a probable cause determination are viewed from an objective standpoint, the
officer's subjective beliefs concerning that determination are not material.
(Citations omitted). Id, 129 Idaho at 136-37, 922 P.2d at 1062-63. (Emphasis
added).
Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation
or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124,982, P.2d 954, 959
(Ct App. 1999). "Subjective good faith on the part of the officer is not enough." Id
Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances and "the whole picture must
yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or
has been engaged in wrongdoing." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963,88 P.3d 780, 782
(Ct App. 2004).
In the case at hand, the objective facts in the record at first contact with Mr. Nicolescu
were 1) Officer Palic detected an odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Nicolescu, 2) he noted red,
bloodshot and watery eyes, and 3) Mr. Nicolescu admitted to consuming alcohol earlier in the
evening.
In addition to those facts, other facts made by the Magistrate which could be reasonably
viewed to dispel reasonable suspicion were Officer Palic noted no slurred speech or memory
impairment and observed cuts and abrasions to Mr. Nicolescu's face which he assumed were
caused the deployment of the airbag, as well as, could have caused the red, watery and bloodshot
eyes. Paramedics were at the scene and diagnosed Mr. Nicolescu with a scratched cornea to his
left eye. Officer Palic was unaware of any traffic infractions or driving pattern performed by Mr.
Nicolescu, other than he was responding to a motor vehicle collision involving Mr. Nicolescu.
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At this point in the investigation, Officer Palic may have had enough reasonable and
articulable suspicion to request Mr. Nicolescu to submit to field sobriety tests.
Officer Palic admitted he was only able to perform a partial nystagmus test and during
the test he could tell Mr. Nicolescu's left eye was clearly bothering him. (TR., p. 9, LL 1-4 and
10-12). The record shows Mr. Nicolescu had a scratched cornea during the performance of the
HON test. Based on the partial nystagmus test, Officer Palic detected four (4) decision points
out of a total of six (6). Officer Palic decided not to have Mr. Nicolescu to perform any other
field sobriety tests, his reason being:
Again, it was to benefit Mr. Nicolescu. I could tell he was obviously - - the
adrenaline was starting to kick in from the collision; I could just tell that just
based on how he was standing, you could see him physically shaking. So, to give
him the benefit of the doubt, I was not going to make him go through those,
'cause clearly he would have met decision points and it would have been
much harder to determine, okay, is that the result of him and adrenaline.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a positive HON test in conjunction with other
field sobriety tests may supply probable cause for arrest, but standing alone does not provide
proof positive of driving under the influence of alcohoL State v, Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811
P.2d 488 (1991); cf State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999) (defendant
failed HON test, one-leg stand test, and heel-toe walking test).
Officer Palic, not Mr. Nicolescu, elected not to conduct any further field sobriety tests
because he would not have been able to determine whether the failure of those tests was the
result of alcohol or the accident. However, as mentioned above, other non-standardized field
sobriety tests focusing on the cognitive function could have been offered.
Officer Palic testified he was familiar with the deployment of airbags and that the red,
blood shot and watery eyes could have been caused by dust and debris from the deployment of
the airbag. Officer Palic also stated that he could not remember whether he spoke to paramedics
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to confirm Mr. Nicolescu was medically cleared before administering the HGN test.
At this point of the investigation, just prior to having Mr. Nicolescu submit to the
preliminary breath test, the objective facts Officer Palic possessed at the time were 1) he detected
the odor of alcohol on Mr. Nicolescu's breath, 2) Mr. Nicolescu admitted to drinking alcohol that
night and 3) he conducted a partial HGN test which he detected 4 out of 6 decisions points to Mr.
Nicolescu who had suffered a scratched cornea from the deployment of the airbag as a result of
the collision.
Other objective facts which a reasonable and prudent person would have considered were
that Mr. Nicolescu was not slurring his speech, showed no signs of memory impairment, suffered
a scratched cornea, and debris had gotten into his eyes which Officer Palic acknowledged could
have been the reason for the eyes appearing red, glassy and bloodshot. At this point, Officer
Palic did not have probable cause to request Mr. Nicolescu to submit to a preliminary breath test.
Only after Officer Palic reviewed the test result for a general concentration level of alcohol in
Mr. Nicolescu's system did he then arrest him and proceed forward with administering additional
breath tests with the LifeLoc.
Based on the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Palic at the time and from the
view of an objective standard through a reasonable and prudent person having available all the
same facts, Officer Palic did not have the requisite probable cause to request Mr. Nicolescu's to
submit to the preliminary breath test. Absent the result of the preliminary breath test, Officer
Moore testified that the investigation would have been concluded. Even if the officer only
needed to satisfy reasonable and articulable suspicion, in order to request Mr. Nicolescu to
submit to the preliminary breath test, the statute does not authorize administering a preliminary
evidentiary test in order to substantiate probable cause to arrest and administer more evidentiary
tests.

Probable cause must exist before an officer may administer evidentiary tests.
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See

Martinez-Gonzalez, supra.
Officer Palic' s only reason for administering the preliminary breath test, despite having
knowledge of Mr. Nicolescu's admission to drinking that evening and his detection of an
alcoholic odor, was nothing prohibited him from doing so. (TR., p. 20, LL 9-13).
Q. Okay. You testified earlier that - that you believed you had enough
information to - to arrest Mr. Nicolescu regardless of the preliminary breath test;
is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. I guess I'm going to ask why, then, have him submit to a preliminary breath
test?
A. I guess my question to you would be why not? Again, it's another tool that's
allowed to me, that I can use.
(TR., p. 26, Ll. 24-25, p.27, Ll. 1-8).
The same response was true for Officer Moore:

Q. So, why administer a preliminary breath test, that there was no need to, to test
for determination of or detecting alcohol in his system.
A. Well, some officers do it, some don't. I - I don't personally like doing it, but
some officers do and there's no - nothing that says we can't. ..
(TR., p. 35, Ll. 5-10).
The Magistrate, not the District Court, had the power to judge the witnesses' credibility,
weigh the evidence, resolve factual conflicts and could draw reasonable inferences from their
testimony and concluded that the preliminary breath test result of .1 08 was the only reason the
officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion and/or probable cause to arrest Mr. Nicolescu
for suspicion of driving under the influence and request him to submit to further evidentiary
testing.
"In this case Palic testified that based on what he had observed he would have
arrested Nicolescu for suspicion ofDUI prior to administering the preliminary
test. However, Palic' s comments demonstrate there was uncertainty as to whether
Nicolescu was under the influence. Palic indicated to Nicolescu that after the
preliminary breath test he would make his determination from there." See, R., p.
79. (Emphasis added).
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Generally, cases in Idaho that involve probable cause for arrest on suspicion of driving
under the influence require more objective evidence that just the odor of alcohol, admission of
drinking and a partially completed HGN test as evidence of alcohol use in violation of Idaho
Code § 18-8004. See State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140,206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009)
(concluding that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant who smelled strongly of alcohol,
slurred her speech, has glassy and bloodshot eyes, seemed confused, and failed the field sobriety
tests); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 (Ct. App. 2008) (probable cause existed for
arrest where defendant lost footing when exiting vehicle, admitted to consuming alcohol, and
failed field sobriety tests); State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 828, 839 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Ct.
App. 1992) (concluding that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant where the defendant
had difficulty speaking and standing, he smelled of alcohol, he had watery eyes, urine-soaked
trousers, an agitated attitude, and failed field sobriety tests).
D. The District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that the Preliminary
Breath Test could be used to form the basis of Probable Cause to Administer
Further Evidentiary Testing.

Based on the District Court's conclusion that a preliminary breath test is simply another
type of field sobriety test and not an evidentiary test as described in the Idaho Code, Officer Palic
only needed reasonable suspicion to administer the preliminary breath test. Accordingly, the
District Court concluded that the result of the preliminary breath test, regardless of its
admissibility, could be used to form the basis of probable cause to administer further evidentiary
testing. See, R., p. 172 (FN. 4). The District Court held:
Since Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Nicolescu was
driving under the influence, and it was not feasible to have him undergo standard
field sobriety testing, Officer Palic was authorized to direct him to submit to the
preliminary breath test, with or without his consent. See, R., p. 173.
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The District Court cited the unpublished opinion of State v. Carver, 2001 WL 34094000,

* 1 (DJd,) for the general statement that the First Judicial District's review of the case law
suggested that "the near unanimous holdings of Courts in other jurisdictions throughout the
nation has been to limit the use of test results of the preliminary breath testing devices to
determining the issue of probable cause" in support of the proposition that the preliminary breath
test result could be used to support Officer Palic's probable cause to arrest Mr. Nicolescu for
suspicion of driving under the influence, See id. Notwithstanding, the issue addressed in the
unpublished opinion is distinct and does not provide guidance to the issue at hand,
However, the Washington Supreme Court did address a closely related issue and its
reasoning is persuasive and applicable to the case at hand. In State v. Smith, 922 P.2d 811, 130
Wash,2d 215 (Wash. 1996), the Washington Supreme Court addressed the use of preliminary
breath test results for purposes of establish probable cause for an arrest on suspicion of driving
under the influence, Here, the trooper was traveling southbound when he observed a vehicle
coming toward him veer over the center line into his lane, forcing him to swerve to the right to
avoid a collision. See id., 922 P.2d at 813. The trooper followed the driver who stopped at a gas
station, See id. When the trooper approached the driver, he noticed a "strong odor of
intoxicants" coming from the driver's breath. See id. The trooper also noticed "poor finger
dexterity" when the driver was searching for his license, registration and proof of insurance. See
id. The trooper asked the driver to perform some field sobriety tests which he agreed. See id.

The driver failed the field sobriety tests which included reciting the alphabet from a to z, walking
a straight line and standing on one leg. See id., at 813-14. At this point, the trooper concluded
the driver was impaired, See id., at 814.
Thereafter, the trooper requested the driver to submit to a preliminary breath test. The
trooper advised the driver the results were not admissible and obtained his consent. See id. The
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result was not preserved and the trooper did not recall the test result. See id. The driver was
subsequently arrested for DUI. See id.
The driver moved to suppress the results of the Data Master on the grounds that the PBT
was an illegal search in violation of the implied consent law. The motion was denied and the
case proceeded to trial where the jury convicted Smith for DUI. See id.
After several appeals, the case was brought to the Washington Supreme Court for review.
The Court commenced its analysis by discussing the portable breath test.
The present case is prompted largely by the decision of Trooper Wiley to use the
PBT, a device counsel for the State referred to in oral argument as
"experimental." RCW 46.61.506(3) provides breath test results are valid only if
administered in accordance with procedures adopted by the state toxicologist.
That official has not approved the PBT for measuring alcohol in a person's breath.
WAC 448-13-020 (1996 Supp.) ("DataMater is the only breath test instrument
approved by the state toxicologist").

Nevertheless, in the absence of a Frye hearing on the PBT, or specific approval of
the device and its administration by the state toxicologist, the result garnered
from the PBT is inadmissible for any purpose, and the State employs such
unapproved devices at its peril if it attempts to use the evidence they generate
to establish probable cause. Here, there was ample evidence of Smith's
intoxication to establish probable cause without the PBT. 922 P.2d at 815
(Emphasis added).
In oral argument, the State suggested that the trooper may have used the PBT result to
decide whether he had probable cause to arrest Smith for DUI. See id. at 816. The Court was
not concerned because the evidence in the record established the trooper had probable cause
before administering the PBT test. "Even if the PBT result had been improperly utilized to
decide probable cause, the DataMaster results were not the fruit of the poisonous tree. Apart
from the PBT result, there was ample evidence from the totality of the circumstances prior to the
PBT result to support probable cause to arrest." Id.
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After reviewing the record, the findings of fact and arguments raised, the Court
concluded the "evidence of Smith's intoxication in the field overwhelmingly established
probable cause" to arrest him. See id at 818. The Court noted that the State complicated an
otherwise "unremarkable DUI case" by administering the PBT test. In conclusion, the Court
held ,"[I]n this case, there was ample evidence apart from the PBT result to support probable
cause to arrest Smith for DUI, and the BAC Verifier DataMaster results were therefore
admissible." See id
The Washington Supreme Court again reaffirmed the proposition that results from PBT
tests are inadmissible to establish probable cause for driving under the influence. See Thompson
v. State Dept. o/Licensing, 983 P.2d 601,138 Wash.2d 783 (Wash. 1999).
Like Idaho, the state of Washington has not approved PBT tests for measuring alcohol in
a person's breath. Washington has a similar statute to Idaho in that breath test results are valid
only if they are administered in accordance with procedures adopted by a state agency. See
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(l)(e) ("Analysis of blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining
alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by
a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and certification
standards to be set by the Idaho state police, or by any method approved by the Idaho state
police.").
Both Officers Palic and Moore admitted that they were unaware of any statutory
authority or any rules or regulations that governed administering a preliminary breath test. (TR.,
p. 20, LL 9-25, p. 33, Ll. 2-25, p. 34, Ll. 1-2). Officer Moore testified that "the State has never
touched them and certified them as - for use in the field as an evidentiary test." (TR., p. 37, Ll.
24-25, p. 38, L. 1).
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The Magistrate held that the AlcoSensor test "clearly does not meet statutory
requirements for admission of a breath test under LC. 18-8004(4). See, R., p. 78. It is not
certified or performance verified." See id. The Magistrate also noted that there was no express
statutory authority either prohibiting or permitting a preliminary breath test and was not aware of
any Idaho case law discussing the use of PBTs. See id at 78-79.
Officers Palic and Moore testified that a 15 minute wait before administering an
evidentiary test was mandatory under the Idaho state police operating procedures. (TK, p. 19,
LL 10-25, p. 20, L. 1, p. 35, LL 12-25, p. 36, LL 1-8).

Officer Palic admitted that he did not observe the 15 minute period prior to administering
the preliminary breath test (TK, p. 20, LL 2-5). Several Idaho appellate cases have held that an
adequate foundation must be established to admit BAC results. See, State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127,
867 P.2d 1001 (App.l993) (failure to closely observe the individual during the 15 minute
period); State v. Defranco, 143 Idaho 335, 144 P.3d 40 (App.2006) (officer failed to monitor
defendant for continuous 15 minute period immediately preceding test); see also, State v.
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338,882 P.2d 993 (CtApp.l994) and State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988
P .2d 225 (Ct.App.1999).
Although the foregoing cases are not directly on point with the issue of whether an
evidentiary test can be used as the basis to supply an officer with probable cause, the cases are
instructive to support the proposition.
Based on the foregoing facts, in addition to other findings of fact made by the Magistrate
Court, which were supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record, the Magistrate
concluded that the State failed to meet its burden that Mr. Nicolescu's consent for taking the
preliminary breath test was given freely, understanding and voluntarily. See, K, P. 81.
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Contrary to the District Court's holding, the Magistrate held:
Without the preliminary breath test the officer did not have the necessary
reasonable and articulable suspicion to request Nicolescu submit to further
evidentiary testing. See, R., p. 82. (Emphasis added).
It was the power of the Magistrate to assess the credibility of the witnesses, resolve

factual conflicts, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences from the evidence. The
findings of fact determined by the Magistrate were supported by substantial and competent
evidence in the record. Based on the testimony of the witnesses, the Magistrate was in the
position to assess their credibility and specifically expressed the following based on Officer
Palic's own testimony:
In this case Palic testified that based on what he had observed he would have
arrested Nicolescu for suspicion ofDUI prior to administering the preliminary
breath test. However, Palic's comments demonstrate there was uncertainty as
to whether Nicolescu was under the influence. Palic indicated to Nicolescu
that after the preliminary breath test he would make his determination from
there. See, R., p. 79. (Emphasis added).
If reasonable suspicion is the standard to administer a preliminary breath test, more than
speculation or instinct of the officer is required. See, McCarthy, supra. Further, the trial court
must view the evidence from an objective basis since the subjective good faith of an officer is
not enough. See id However, based on the case and statutory authority provided herein, the
proper standard to request a suspect to submit to a preliminary breath test or any other
evidentiary test requires probable cause. Based on the facts of this case, Officer Palic did not
have the requisite probable cause to request Mr. Nicolescu to submit to the preliminary breath
test.
V. CONCLUSION
The practice of administering a preliminary evidentiary test in Idaho is unsettled and
according to Officer Moore not uniform throughout the State. No rules or regulations have been
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promulgated by the Idaho state police addressing when such method should be used and under
what circumstances. Nor has the Idaho Legislature ventured in creating a law authorizing it use,
unlike other jurisdictions. As a result, the uniform practice creates a slippery slope between an
individual's constitutional rights and the state's legitimate interest for the safety of others,
which practice can be fraught with abuse by officers.
Officers, on mere hunches, suspecting an individual is operating a vehicle under the
influence could simply demand the individual to submit to a preliminary breath test to form the
officer's probable cause. Field Sobriety Tests would be irrelevant, and if administered would
result in biased observations of officers to support an arrest.
The District Court judicially created a rule of law by relying on the statutory framework
adopted by other states. If such practice is desired in the State of Idaho, the statute should be
amended to allow for the practice which requires legislative action, not judicially reformation.
This is the province of the legislature.
Based on the foregoing case law, statutory authority and arguments above, Mr. Nicolescu
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's Memorandum Decision and
Order entered on April 16, 2013 and affirm the Magistrate Court's Memorandum Decision
Regarding Motion to Suppress entered on July 25,2012.
DATED this 13 th day of August, 2013.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

By:
ED GUERRICABEITIA, of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13 th day of August, 2013, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method
indicated, and addressed as follows:
Boise City Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500

[ ]

[vf
[

]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Facsimile

Ed Guerricabeitia
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Indiana Code 9-30-7
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Information Maintained by the Office of Code Revision Indiana Legislative Services Agency
IC 9-30-7
Chapter 7. Implied Consent in Accidents Involving Serious Injury or Death
IC 9-30-7-0.5
Inapplicability to operator of personal assistive mobility device
Sec. 0.5. This chapter does not apply to the operator of an electric personal assistive mobility device.
As added by P.L.143-2002, SEC9.
IC 9-30-7-1
Definitions
Sec. 1. (a) As used in this chapter, "portable breath test" means a hand held apparatus that measures
the alcohol concentration in a breath sample delivered by a person into the mouthpiece of the apparatus.
(b) As used in this chapter, "fatal accident" means an accident, a collision, or other occurrence that
involves at least one (1) vehicle and that results in:
(1) death; or
(2) bodily injury that gives a law enforcement officer reason to believe that the death of at least one
(1) person is imminent.
As added by P.L.2-1991, SEC 18. Amended by P.L.275-2001, SECr
IC 9-30-7-2
Implied consent to portable breath test or chemical test
Sec. 2. A person who operates a vehicle impliedly consents to submit to the portable breath test or
chemical test under this chapter as a condition of operating a vehicle in Indiana. A person must submit
to each portable breath test or chemical test offered by a law enforcement officer under this chapter to
comply with this chapter.
As added by P.L.2-1991, SEC 18. Amended by P.L.275-2001, SEC2.
IC 9-30-7-3
Offer of test; administration of test
Sec. 3. (a) A law enforcement officer shall offer a portable breath test or chemical test to any person
who the officer has reason to believe operated a vehicle that was involved in a fatal accident or an
accident involving serious bodily injury. If:
(1) the results of a portable breath test indicate the presence of alcohol;
(2) the results of a portable breath test do not indicate the presence of alcohol but the law
enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person is under the influence of a controlled
substance or another drug; or
(3) the person refuses to submit to a portable breath test;
the law enforcement officer shall offer a chemical test to the person.
(b) A law enforcement officer may offer a person more than one (1) portable breath test or chemical
test under this section. However, all chemical tests must be administered within three (3) hours after
the fatal accident or the accident involving serious bodily injury.
(c) It is not necessary for a law enforcement officer to offer a portable breath test or chemical test to
an ullconscious person.

http://WVvw.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title9/ar30/ch7.html
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As added by P.L.2-1991, SEC 18. Amended by P.L.275-2001, SEC 3.
IC 9-30-7-4
Breath analysis; blood, urine, or other bodily substance; testing requirements
Sec. 4. (a) If a chemical test conducted under this chapter involves an analysis of breath, the test must
comply with the requirements under IC 9-30-6-5.
(b) IC 9-30-6-6 applies if a physician or a person trained in obtaining bodily substance samples who is
acting under the direction of or under a protocol prepared by a physician or who has been engaged to
obtain bodily substance samples:
(1) obtains a blood, urine, or other bodily substance sample from a person at the request of a law
enforcement officer who acts under this section; or
(2) perfonns a chemical test on blood, urine, or another bodily substance obtained from a person
under this section.
As added by P.L.2-1991, SEC18.
IC 9-30-7-5
Refusal to submit; penalties; suspension; proof of future financial responsibility
Sec. 5. (a) A person who refuses to submit to a portable breath test or chemical test offered under this
chapter commits a Class C infraction. However, the person commits a Class A infraction if the person
has at least one (1) previous conviction for operating while intoxicated.
(b) In addition to any other penalty imposed, the court shall suspend the person's driving privileges:
(1) for one (1) year; or
(2) if the person has at least one (1) previous conviction for operating while intoxicated, for two (2)
years.
(c) During the three (3) years following the tennination of the suspension, the person's driving
privileges remain suspended until the person provides proof of future financial responsibility in force
under IC 9-25.
As added by P.L.2-199J, SEC 18. Amended by P.L.275-2001, SEC4; P.L.94-2006, SEC 9; P.L.85-2013,
SEC 98.
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Title 23: Motor Vehicles
Chapter 13: OPERATION OF VEHICLES
23 V.S.A. § 1203. Administration of tests; retention of test and videotape

§ 1203. Administration of tests; retention of test and videotape
(a) A breath test shall be administered only by a person who has been certified by the
Vermont criminal justice training council to operate the breath testing equipment being
employed. In any proceeding under this subchapter, a person's testimony that he or she is
certified to operate the breath testing equipment employed shall be prima facie evidence of
that fact.
(b) Only a physician, licensed nurse, medical technician, physician's assistant, medical
technologist, or laboratory assistant acting at the request of a law enforcement officer may
withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or other drug. This
limitation does not apply to the taking of a breath sample.
(c) When a breath test which is intended to be introduced in evidence is taken with a
crimper device or when blood is withdrawn at an officer's request, a sufficient amount of
breath or blood, as the case may be, shall be taken to enable the person to have made an
independent analysis of the sample, and shall be held for at least 45 days from the date the
sample was taken. At any time during that period the person may direct that the sample be
sent to an independent laboratory of the person's choosing for an independent analysis. The
department of public safety shall adopt rules providing for the security of the sample. At no
time shall the defendant or any agent of the defendant have access to the sample. A
preserved sample of breath shall not be required when an infrared breath-testing instrument
is used. A person tested with an infrared breath-testing instrument shall have the option of
having a second infrared test administered immediately after receiving the results of the firs
t test.
(d) In the case of a breath test administered using an infrared breath testing instrument,
the test shall be analyzed in compliance with rules adopted by the department of public
safety. The analyses shall be retained by the state. A sample is adequate if the infrared
breath testing instrument analyzes the sample and does not indicate the sample is deficient.
Analysis of the person's breath or blood which is available to that person for independent
analysis shall be considered valid when performed according to methods approved by the
department of public safety. The analysis performed by the state shall be considered valid
when performed according to a method or methods selected by the department of public
safety. The department of public safety shall use rule making procedures to select its
method or methods. Failure of a person to provide an adequate breath sample constitutes a

refusaL

The Vermont Statutes Online

Page 2 of2

(e) [Repealed.]

(f) When a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a person may be violating
or has violated section 1201 of this title, the officer may request the person to provide a
sample of breath for a preliminary screening test using a device approved by the
commissioner of public safety for this purpose. The person shall not have the right to
consult an attorney prior to submitting to this preliminary breath alcohol screening test. The
results of this preliminary screening test may be used for the purpose of deciding whether
an arrest should be made and whether to request an evidentiary test and shall not be used in
any court proceeding except on those issues. Following the screening test additional tests
may be required of the operator pursuant to the provisions of section 1202 of this title.
(g) The office of the chief medical examiner shall report in writing to the department of
motor vehicles the death of any person as the result of an accident involving a vehicle and
the circumstances of such accident within five days of such death.
(h) A Vermont law enforcement officer shall have a right to request a breath or blood
sample in an adjoining state or country under this section unless prohibited by the law of the
other state or country. If the law in an adjoining state or country does not prohibit an officer
acting under this section from taking a breath or blood sample in its jurisdiction, evidence of
such sample shall not be excluded in the courts of this state solely on the basis that the test
was taken outside the state.
(i) The commissioner of public safety shall adopt emergency rules relating to the
operation, maintenance and use of preliminary alcohol screening devices for use by law
enforcement officers in enforcing the provisions of this title. The commissioner shall
consider relevant standards of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in
adopting such rules. Any preliminary alcohol screening device authorized for use under this
title shall be on the qualified products list ofthe National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.

G) A videotape made of the alleged offense and subsequent processing may be erased or
destroyed by the law enforcement agency no earlier than 90 days after final judgment, or, if
no civil or criminal action is filed, no earlier than 90 days after the date the videotape was
made.
(k) A copy of a videotape made of the alleged offense shall be provided to the defendant
within ten days after the defendant requests the copy and pays a $45.00 fee for its
reproduction. No fee shall be charged to a defendant whom the court has determined to be
indigent. (Added 1969, No. 267 (Adj. Sess.), § 3; amended 1971, No. 14, § 8, eff. March
11, 1971; 1971, No. 260 (Adj. Sess.), § 48; 1973, No. 79, § 3, eff. May 23, 1973; 1975, No.
103, § 1, eff. May 30, 1975; 1981, No. 103, § 4; 1989, No. 68, § 4, eff. Dec. 1, 1989; 1991,
No. 55, § 4; No. 57, §§ 1,4, eff. July 4, 1991; 1997, No. 57, § 2; 1999, No. 160 (Adj. Sess.),
§ 17, eff. May 29,2000; 2007, No. 153 (Adj. Sess.), § 2; 2011, No. 56, § 14, eff. March 1,
2012.)

